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I. INTRODUCTION

This article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating to oil, gas,
and mineral law in Texas from November 1, 2012, through October 31, 2013.
The cases examined include decisions of state and federal courts in the State of
Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 1
II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES 2
Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar 3 held that a lessee’s implied surface
easement entitled the lessee to use a road across the surface of the leased tract to
produce oil from any land pooled with the leased tract, so long as at least part of
the purpose for using the road was to produce oil from the leased tract.4 The

∗ Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil, gas, and
mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are not included.
Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of interest. The facts in the
cases are sometimes simplified to focus on the legal principles.
2. Other notable cases dealing with title and conveyancing issues include the following:
Coates Energy Trust v. Frost Nat’l Bank, No. 04-11-00838-CV, 2012 WL 5984693 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Nov. 28, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (three part deed construction); Chesapeake
Exploration, L.L.C. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied)
(conveyance of executive rights); Dupnik v. Hermis, No. 04-12-00417-CV, 2013 WL 979199 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (conveyance of surface only reserves
minerals); Key Prod. Co., Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc., No. 10-10-00379-CV, 2013 WL 1286672
(Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (depth limitation in designation of unit
incorporated into subsequent assignment); Meekins v. Wisnoski, 404 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (sale of minerals subject to probate); Thomason v. Badgett, No.
02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(deed reservation construed against grantor).
3. Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar, 403 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, pet. granted).
4. Id. at 321.
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Richardson Tract and the Curbo Tract were adjoining tracts. 5 Beginning in
1987, Key Operating leased and produced oil from the Richardson Tract.6 In
1994, Key Operating acquired a lease on the Curbo Tract and built a road
across the surface of the Curbo Tract to access oil wells on both tracts. 7 In 2000,
the last well on the Curbo Tract stopped producing, and Key Operating
acquired a new lease with a pooling clause on an undivided 1/16 of the minerals
in the Curbo Tract. 8 Pursuant to the new lease, Key Operating pooled the
Richardson and Curbo Tracts into the forty-acre Richardson–Curbo Unit. 9 The
Unit included thirty acres from the Richardson Tract and ten acres out of the
eighty-five acres in the Curbo Tract. 10 All production was from wells located on
the Richardson Tract, which Key Operating accessed using the road across the
Curbo Tract. In 2002, the Hegars purchased an unsevered 1/4 mineral interest
and the surface of the Curbo Tract and built a house very close to the road. 11
Subsequently, Key Operating drilled a new well on the Richardson Tract that
increased its use of the road. 12 In 2007, the Hegars sued Key Operating for
trespass and sought a permanent injunction against Key Operating’s continued
use of the road. After a bench trial, the trial court permanently enjoined Key
Operating from using the road for any purpose related to the production of
minerals off the Curbo Tract. 13 The court entered a finding of fact that no
minerals were being produced from the Curbo Tract. 14
The Hegars advanced a number of theories on appeal that, if sustained,
would have been very disruptive for the industry. The Hegars generally lost those
points and the opinion is broadly supportive of the dominance of the mineral
estate and the scope of the implied right to use the surface that is appurtenant to
the mineral estate. Nevertheless, the Hegars won on a single factual sufficiency
point, because there was no oil being produced from the Curbo Tract. 15
The Hegars contended that the Key Operating lease and the pooling
agreement did not exist prior to the original severance of the surface estate from
the 1/16 of the mineral estate eventually leased by Key Operating and therefore
were not in the Hegars’ chain of title or binding on them. 16 The Hegars also
contended that the rights of mineral owners to subsequently use the surface
estate were limited to those rights that existed at the time of the mineral
severance. 17 The court agreed that Key Operating’s lease and pooling agreement,
which are not part of the Hegars’ chain of title and to which they did not agree,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 324.
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cannot expand Key Operating’s right to use the Hegars’ surface. 18 Under the
common law, the owner or lessee of the dominant mineral estate has a right to
develop the minerals, which includes “‘an implied right to use the surface estate
in ways reasonably necessary to carry out its operations.’” 19 The mineral lessee’s
implied right to use the surface also generally extends to the surface of a pooled
area, but a lease executed after the time the mineral and surface estates are
severed is not part of the surface estate’s chain of title and cannot bind
subsequent surface estate owners without their consent. 20 Therefore, Key
Operating could not rely on its lease and pooling agreement to support its right
to use the road on the Hegars’ land. 21 In summary, the Hegars acquired a
surface estate which was not subject to an existing lease.
However, as a mineral lessee of an interest in the Curbo Tract, “Key
Operating has the same surface rights [the mineral owner] has always had: the
right to use the surface of the Curbo Tract to produce oil from beneath the
surface, regardless of whether that oil is comingled with oil from other tracts.” 22
A mineral owner’s implied surface “easement necessarily includes the rights of
ingress and egress upon the land for the exploration and production of oil and
gas.” 23 The court held that Key Operating’s common law surface easement gave
it the right to use the road on the Curbo Tract to produce oil from the
Richardson–Curbo Unit so long as part of the purpose for using the road
included obtaining production from the Curbo Tract. 24 Thus, while the Hegars
were not bound by the terms of Key Operating’s lease or pooling agreement, Key
Operating had the right to use the road across the Hegars’ surface to explore and
extract oil from the Curbo Tract, even if the extracted oil was comingled with oil
from the Richardson Tract and produced using a well on the Richardson Tract
pursuant to a pooling agreement. 25 The opinion is a thorough analysis of the
scope of the common law implied easement and the limits imposed by, and the
relationship to, the accommodation doctrine. 26
The court expressly rejected the Hegars’ theory that the mineral owners’
surface rights were restricted to those that existed at the time of the mineral
severance, which would effectively preclude pooling by anyone who did not also
own the surface estate, and which would be contrary to Texas public policy. 27
The court held that the right to use the surface of the Curbo Tract to access the
Richardson-Curbo Unit wells was supported by “(1) the nature of the implied
surface easement, (2) practical and public policy considerations, and (3)
analogous cases,” but only “so long as that production includes production from

18. Id. at 326.
19. Id. (quoting SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 314 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. App.—Austin
2010, pet. denied)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 325.
23. Id. at 326 (citing Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 325.
26. Id. at 329–30.
27. Id. at 327.
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the Curbo Tract.” 28
The trial court, after listening to competing experts, determined that no oil
was being produced from the Curbo Tract. 29 In the absence of a pooling or
similar agreement to which the Hegars consented or to which they or their title
are otherwise subject, Key Operating had no right to use the road across the
Hegars’ surface for the purpose of producing oil that was being produced only
from the Richardson Tract. 30
The dissenting opinion is based largely on the belief that the majority opinion
turns on the accommodation doctrine. 31 However, the majority opinion
generally discusses the accommodation doctrine only in the context of being the
remedy for the surface owner whose surface use is impaired or limited. This case
turned on whether the implied surface easement existed when there was no
production from the surface owner’s tract. The majority also noted that the case
related exclusively to injunctive relief. 32 The issue was not excessive use or the
reasonableness of use, which could subject a mineral owner or lessee to liability
for damages. 33
This case is important because it broadly supports surface uses related to
pooling and off-lease unit production and comingling of that production,
provided only that there is evidence of some production from the tract subjected
to the surface use. The production fact question will be troublesome, because it
will generally require expert testimony to obtain a finding. Prior to trial,
uncertainty is generally leverage for the surface owner. Presumably, “production”
in this context is not limited to actual production, but includes operations
intended to obtain production. However, there are many Texas cases holding
that “production” means actual production under other facts and circumstances.
Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd. 34 held that a
conveyance of a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) was effective to convey
a fractional royalty of 1/16 of production. 35 The parties aligned as successors-ininterest to the Grantor and Grantee under three deeds with an identical issue. 36
The deeds reserved to Grantor an NPRI equal to “one-half (1/2) of the usual
one-eighth (1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other minerals produced,
saved and sold.” 37 A subsequent lease provided for royalty payments equal to
1/4 of production. 38 The issue in the case was whether Grantor reserved 1/16 of
production (1/2 of 1/8 = 1/16 [fractional royalty]) or 1/8 of production (1/2 of
1/4 = 1/8 [fraction of royalty]). 39
28. Id.
29. Id. at 336.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 336–38 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 331.
33. Id.
34. Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV,
2013 WL 2470898 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 6, 2013, pet. denied).
35. Id. at *1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *4.
38. Id. at *1.
39. Id. at *1–2.
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The Texas Supreme Court has construed “one-half of one-eighth of the oil,
gas and other mineral royalty” to mean a 1/16 fractional royalty. 40 The language
that the Court construed did not contain the words “the usual.” 41 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals has construed “an undivided one-fourth of the usual
one-eighth royalty in all of the oil, gas or other minerals produced, saved and
sold from the premises conveyed under the terms of any valid oil and gas lease”
to mean a 1/32 fractional royalty. 42 The court found these precedents to be
persuasive and held that the deeds reserved a 1/16 fractional royalty as a matter
of law, after relying upon the usual canons of construction: determining the
intent of the parties, the “four corners” rule, and harmonizing all parts. 43
There continues to be some tension between various opinions construing the
effect of the words “the usual 1/8 royalty” when used in instruments executed
during the time when the lease royalty was almost always 1/8. The tilt seems to
be toward holding that the words are merely descriptive of the fractional royalty
conveyed or reserved, rather than objective evidence of an intent to create a
fraction of royalty (floating royalty).
Gonyea v. Kerby 44 construed two conflicting contracts for deed against the
draftsman after considering extrinsic evidence. Gonyea contracted with Kerby to
sell and convey two lots that together comprised just over two acres in Alvarado,
Texas. Gonyea drafted two contracts for deed, signed them, and sent them to
Kerby. Kerby signed both, sent one back to Gonyea, and Kerby kept the other.
The contract retained by Kerby stated that the mineral rights in the property
would be conveyed to the purchaser when the note for the deed had been paid
in full, while the contract returned to Gonyea stated just the opposite—that no
mineral rights would be conveyed to the purchaser even when the note was paid
in full. By the contract’s terms, it was a monthly installment sale over a fifteenyear term.45 In 2005, Gonyea signed an oil and gas lease on the property. 46 In
2008, shortly before the final payment was due, Kerby noticed that there was oil
and gas activity happening on the property and contacted Gonyea to inquire
about the mineral rights. 47 Gonyea told Kerby that Kerby did not own the
mineral rights and that they were not for sale. 48 Kerby made his final payment,
and when Gonyea refused to convey the minerals, Kerby sued Gonyea for
breach of contract. 49
The parties agreed that their agreement was ambiguous, and Kerby obtained a
jury verdict on his breach-of-contract claim. 50 The issue on appeal was the

40. Id. at *4 (quoting Harris v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ
denied)).
43. Id. at *5.
44. Gonyea v. Kerby, No. 10-12-00182-CV, 2013 WL 4040117 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 8,
2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id. at *1 n.2.
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id.
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sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury finding that the parties had
agreed to convey the minerals. 51
The court found that neither contract, when read alone, was ambiguous, and
that the ambiguity only results from reading the two contracts together. 52 The
court cited the usual rules of construction that the intent of the parties is to be
determined from the written agreement and that separate instruments executed
at the same time, between the same parties, and relating to the same subject
matter may be considered together and construed as one contract. 53 The court
resolved this conundrum by concluding that the jury had, in effect, picked
which contract was the agreement between the parties, and the determination of
which contract was the agreement was a fact question. The existence of the
second contract that differed from the first was parol evidence indicating that
there were issues of fact for the jury to decide. The fact that Gonyea drafted two
contracts and Kerby kept one of the contracts was enough for the jury to find
that the parties agreed on the contract Kerby kept. 54
Moreover, if forced to construe the two contracts together, the court held that
it would still find for Kerby as a matter of law because Gonyea drafted both of
the contracts for deed. Texas law provides that contracts are to be construed
against the draftsman. 55
Because the two contracts were so clearly irreconcilable, the case highlights
the significance of a fact finding at the trial court level regarding the
“agreement” of the parties, and the risk of being the draftsman under the law
applicable to the construction of the agreement of the parties.
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES 56
Stroud Prod., L.L.C. v. Hosford 57 held that a lessee could intentionally wash out
an overriding royalty interest by allowing the burdened lease to terminate while
acquiring an unburdened top lease. 58 In 1978, the lessor granted two leases
(Base Leases) that were subsequently drilled, produced, and burdened by a
combined 5% overriding royalty held by Hosford, et al. (Hosford). 59 In
51. Id.
52. Id. at *5 n.4.
53. Id. at *4.
54. Id. at *5.
55. Id.
56. Other notable cases dealing with lease and leasing issues include the following: Wade v.
XTO Energy Inc., No. 02-12-00007-CV, 2013 WL 257361 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2013,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (lease and statute of frauds); Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d
348 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. filed) (duty owed by executive to NPRI owner); Potts v.
Chesapeak Exploration, L.L.C., No. 3:12-CV-1596-O, 2013 WL 874711 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2013)
(mem. op.) (net-back market value at point of sale); Fain Family First Ltd. P’ship v. EOG Res. Inc.,
No. 02-12-00081-CV, 2013 WL 1668281(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (shut-in royalty on well not connected to pipeline); Torch Energy Advisors Inc. v. Plains
Exploration & Prod. Co., 409 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. filed) (recovery
of overpaid royalty); Lucas v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00592-JRG, 2013 WL
5200046 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013) (class action on deductions of post-production costs).
57. Stroud Prod., L.L.C. v. Hosford, 405 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
pet. filed).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 798.
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December 2003, Stroud et al. (Stroud) acquired the Base Leases and assumed
operations. 60 In January 2004, production ceased because of a minor mechanical
problem.61 In February 2004, Stroud acquired Top Leases on different terms on
the same property. 62 In April 2004, the Base Leases terminated for failure to
resume production within the time permitted under the ninety-day continuous
operations clause. 63 In May 2004, Stroud fixed the mechanical problem and
promptly resumed production, but under the Top Leases. 64 The assignments of
overriding royalty to Hosford burdening the Base Leases did not contain
renewal and extension clauses. 65 Stroud refused to pay overriding royalty to
Hosford. 66 “Stroud admitted that he intentionally returned the well to
production in June 2004, only after the [Base Leases] had terminated, [the Top
Leases] had been obtained, and the 90-day continuous operations period had
passed. He also admitted that he ‘did not want any overriding royalty interest on
the new leases and [Hosford’s] overriding royalty interests had been ‘washed
out.’” 67 There was no express surrender clause in the Base Leases. 68
The issue was whether Texas recognizes a cause of action for intentional
termination of an overriding royalty interest. 69 The court surveyed in detail
relevant Texas cases on the duty a lessee owes to an overriding royalty interest
holder under Texas law. 70 The court concluded that:
In sum, no Texas court has yet recognized that a lessee generally owes any
type of duty, whether it be an implied contractual covenant or a fiduciarytype duty, to protect the interest of an overriding royalty interest holder so
as to require the lessee to make repairs to well equipment, perpetuate the
lease, and ensure that such overriding interests are not extinguished. 71
The court observed that the two Texas Supreme Court opinions on topic,
Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes 72 and Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Investments, Inc.,73
indicate that although the question of whether any duty is owed is uncertain
under Texas law, the language of the controlling documents, and the
circumstances and relationships of the parties should be considered when
making such a determination. 74
As to the circumstances and relationship of the parties, the court found no
evidence of a formal fiduciary relationship between Stroud and Hosford, and

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 799.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 798–800.
Id. at 799–800.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 803–09.
Id. at 809.
Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967).
Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Investments, Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004).
Stroud, 405 S.W.3d at 809.
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there was no special relationship of trust and confidence spanning over a long
period of time. 75 Thus, there was no relationship duty.
As to the language of the controlling documents, the court first observed that
the assignments of overriding royalty did not include a renewal or extension
clause, which some courts have suggested may provide some evidence of a
fiduciary relationship or support a constructive trust remedy. 76 However, those
same courts then noted that when the underlying lease has an express surrender
clause, there can be no implied duty to keep the lease in effect. 77 Thus, the court
noted that a renewal clause, if it existed, could provide some evidence of a
fiduciary relationship, but it would not be determinative. 78 The Base Leases did
not include an express surrender clause that would permit the lessee to
terminate the leases at will and thereby support the conclusion that there is no
duty owed by the lessee to the overriding royalty owner. However, at least one
Texas court has held that the absence of an express surrender clause in the lease,
even when there is a renewals and extensions clause in the assignment of
overriding royalty, is not enough to impose a duty. 79
Here the court did not find anything in the assignment of the overriding
royalty interest or the Base Leases that obligated Stroud to take other action to
perpetuate the lease, and therefore, the absence of an express surrender clause in
the Base Leases did not indicate some sort of special duty that Stroud owed
Hosford.80 The court concluded that while a party that engages in conduct to
intentionally wash out an overriding royalty interest may be subject to liability,
because here there was no evidence that Stroud violated any express or implied
contractual duty and there was no evidence of the existence of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, Stroud did not commit an actionable wrong by
intentionally terminating the Base Leases to extinguish the overriding royalty
interest. 81 There is a lengthy dissent that is generally based on the fact that there
was no express surrender clause in the Base Leases. 82 It reads the Base Leases
into the assignment of overriding royalty interests to conclude that lease clauses,
such as the implied covenant to reasonably develop, created duties that the
lessee owed to the overriding royalty owner. 83
This case appears to squarely raise the issue of the duty owed by the lessee to
the holder of an overriding royalty interest in a “wash-out” transaction. This case
holds that there is no duty owed, in the absence of renewals and extensions
clause, if the lessee is simply pursing its own best interests.
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Healey, L.P. 84 held that an oil and gas lease
75. Id. at 809–10.
76. Id. at 810.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 123, 124, 126 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 811 (citing Keese v. Cont’l Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1956)).
82. Id. at 814–35 (Keyes, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Healey, L.P., No. 12-11-00236-CV, 2013 WL 1282007 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Mar. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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terminated for breach of covenant. Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation (Cabot) was
the lessee and operator of three oil and gas leases and Healey, L.P. (Healey) was
the lessor. There were multiple production units and at least twenty-one wells
were drilled.85 The leases each contained the following provisions:
Lessee shall, during the drilling of any wells on the leased premises, furnish
Lessor daily drilling reports, copies of all logs runs, monthly production
reports for the life of said well(s), copies of all reports and forms filed with
the State regulatory bodies in connection with such wells, well locations,
dates of completion and abandonment. Lessee shall also furnish Lessor
copies of any title opinions or title reports which Lessee may obtain on the
leased premises.
***
Any breach by Lessee of any term, provision[,] or covenant in this lease
shall be grounds for cancellation of this lease (together with any other
remedies available to Lessor). 86
Healey alleged that Cabot and Cabot’s predecessor had failed to furnish the
information as required by the leases, suggested that the leases had terminated,
and requested to be treated as a working interest owner in the pooled units.
Cabot responded by attempting to provide the missing data. Healey filed suit
asserting claims for breach of contract, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
leases had terminated and that Healey was an unleased cotenant, and requesting
an accounting. 87 That these leases could terminate for breach of covenant was
apparently uncontroverted, and the issues in the case were generally procedural
and matters of proof.
The case was tried as a declaratory judgment action rather than in trespass to
try title. 88 The court reviewed various Texas cases that were illustrative of the
difference between the two causes of action, and concluded that, “[w]ith an
exception not applicable here, a trespass to try title claim is the exclusive method
in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title to real property.” 89 Because the
case should have been in trespass to try title, Cabot contended that the
declaratory judgment should be reversed, 90 that attorney’s fees could not be
awarded, 91 and that Healey had failed to meet the strict evidentiary burdens
required in trespass to try title. 92 The court held that Cabot failed to preserve
error on all of those points by not submitting an exception in writing to the trial
court prior to the submission of the charge under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
90. 93
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (West 2000)).
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3–5.
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Much of the proof required to establish drilling costs on each well was
dependent upon a business records affidavit with multiple records attached as
provided by Cabot’s predecessor. 94 Cabot’s well-by-well payout methodology was
apparently unchallenged, but the underlying evidence was contested on the basis
of Healey’s objections that the exhibit was hearsay, constituted an impermissible
summary, and failed to demonstrate that the costs set forth therein were
reasonable and necessary. 95 The trial court sustained Healey’s objections and
excluded the evidence; however, this decision was reversed on appeal. 96 Of
particular note, the court held that evidence that the costs were reasonable and
necessary was not required to secure admissibility of the business records, but
only as an element of proof of the defense of offset. 97
Having held that the exhibit was improperly excluded, the court next weighed
the gravity of the harm to Cabot as a result of the exclusion. The court recited
the rule that an error causes harm if it is dispositive of a material issue. 98 Here,
although Cabot was precluded from introducing the exhibit into evidence, it
would still have been required to show that the expenses outlined in the exhibit
were reasonable and necessary. 99 Surprisingly, after reviewing and analyzing the
evidence and the relationship between Cabot and its predecessor, the court held
that Cabot did not and could not demonstrate that the costs outlined in the
exhibit were reasonable and necessary. Thus, the exclusion of the exhibit was
not harmful. 100
Perhaps Cabot’s best chance to preserve its leases on the merits was the
affirmative defense of substantial performance, but the trial court refused
Cabot’s requested issue. 101 The court noted that jury instructions are reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, and if any part of the question,
instruction, or definition fails, then the court can deny the entire request. 102
Instructions should not have the effect of “advis[ing] the jury of the effect of its
answers.” 103 Here, the proposed instructions would have advised the jury that if
they answered in the affirmative, Healey would not be able to terminate the
leases. 104 Cabot stretched too far for this court. Accordingly, the court held that
the trial court did not err by refusing to submit the proposed question. 105 The
trial court’s rejection of proposed questions on waiver and quasi-estoppel was
also affirmed on appeal. 106
Finally, the court considered whether the trial court erred by not allowing the
recovery of costs from a dry hole that produced data that aided in the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *5–8.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9 (citing Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994)).
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. § 277).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *12–15.
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development of the unit as a whole. 107 The court avoided that issue because,
regardless of the benefit to the land, Cabot had produced no evidence that the
expenses associated with the dry hole were reasonable and necessary. 108
The significance of this case is that it confirms conventional wisdom that a
lease provision making the lease determinable upon breach of covenant is simply
unacceptable to any lessee. How to resolve cases tried as declaratory judgments
that should have been tried in trespass to try title is now a common problem. It
is perhaps a new approach to hold that the party who happens to lose the trial is
stuck on appeal because neither party objected to the failure of both parties to
use the exclusive method in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title to
real property.
PanAmerican Operating, Inc. v. Maud Smith Estate 109 held that an independent
landman’s apparent authority and the company’s failure to promptly repudiate
an oil and gas lease made the lease binding on the company. PanAmerican
Operating, Inc. (PanAm) hired landmen as independent contractors, including
Robert Wormser (Wormser). 110 PanAm provided Wormser with a cubicle, an
office landline, a company email domain name, and the president of PanAm
knew exactly what Wormser was doing on behalf of PanAm. 111 Wormser
contacted William Elder (Elder), the attorney responsible for negotiating leases
on behalf of the Maud Smith Estate (Maud), to negotiate a lease on Maud’s
property for PanAm. 112 Wormser identified himself as a PanAm representative
but never disclosed that he was an independent contractor. 113 Wormser and
Elder agreed on terms, and Wormser sent Elder a form lease from his PanAm
email account.114 On June 2, 2008, Elder accepted and emailed a copy of the
signed lease to Wormser and asked for the lease bonus. 115 On July 21, 2008,
Elder sent the original lease to PanAm. 116 On August 12, 2008, PanAm
acknowledged receipt of the lease. 117 After the price of oil dropped precipitously,
PanAm asserted that Wormser had no authority to execute leases on its
behalf. 118 Apparently, PanAm dodged the payment questions from Elder for
about three months before repudiating the validity of the lease, and PanAm’s
possession of the lease prevented Maud from leasing to a third party. 119 Maud
sued PanAm for breach of contract based on failure to pay the lease bonus. 120
The issues on appeal were whether Wormser held the apparent authority to
bind PanAm and whether PanAm ratified the lease by failing to timely repudiate
107. Id. at *15.
108. Id. at *17.
109. PanAmerican Operating, Inc. v. Maud Smith Estate, 409 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2013, pet. denied).
110. Id. at 171.
111. Id. at 173–74.
112. Id. at 171.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 171, 178 n.4.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 178 n.4.
118. Id. at 174–75.
119. Id. at 178 n.4.
120. Id. at 171.
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the lease. 121
“Apparent authority arises when a principal either knowingly permits its
agent to hold himself out as having authority or acts with such a lack of ordinary
care as to clothe its agent with indicia of authority.” 122 Silence may also
constitute a manifestation of apparent authority. 123 It was undisputed that
Wormser had authority to obtain leases on PanAm’s behalf and to negotiate on
PanAm’s behalf. 124 The court held that a reasonably prudent person would have
believed Wormser possessed the authority to contract on PanAm’s behalf
because PanAm acted with “such a lack of ordinary care as to clothe Wormser
with indicia of authority.” 125
“Ratification is the adoption or confirmation, by a party with actual
knowledge of all material facts, of a prior act that did not then legally bind that
party and which that party had a right to repudiate.” 126 “A party ratifies a
contract by acting under it, performing under it, or affirmatively acknowledging
it.” 127 PanAm knew all the material facts surrounding Wormser’s acquisition of
the lease, and “by keeping the lease and failing to repudiate it when presented
with the opportunity to do so, [PanAm] affirmatively acknowledged its validity,
thereby ratifying it.” 128
PanAm argued there was no clear evidence PanAm intended to ratify the
lease. 129 The court dismissed this argument because Maud was only required to
demonstrate that PanAm performed an “intentional act that was inconsistent
with any intention to avoid the lease.” 130 The “intent may be inferred from the
acceptance of benefits under the lease after having full knowledge of the act that
would make the lease voidable.” 131 The benefit PanAm received was obtaining a
signed lease without having to pay until PanAm determined whether honoring
the lease made economic sense. 132 Therefore, PanAm ratified the lease by failing
to repudiate after obtaining sufficient knowledge of the facts. 133
The significance of this case is that it highlights the risk in failing to promptly
repudiate a lease or a contract to lease. The industry frequently uses contract
landmen, and the facts in this case were particularly bad for PanAm. But the
issues about authority can arise in a narrower context, such as the specific
business points (bonus, royalty, term) in a lease, other lease provisions, or the
lease form itself. Such issues would be more common than a complete
121. Id. at 176.
122. Id. at 172 (citing Gaines v. Kelly, 235 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. 2007)).
123. Id. at 172-73 (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.03, cmt. b (2006)).
124. Id. at 173.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 176 (citing Thomson Oil Royalty, LLC v. Graham, 351 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2011, no pet.)).
127. Id. (citing Thomson Oil, 351 S.W.3d at 166).
128. Id. at 177.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. Co., Inc. v. Fuller, 919 S.W.2d 726, 728 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1996, writ denied)).
131. Id. (citing Williams v. City of Midland, 932 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no
pet.)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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repudiation of authority, but the landman’s apparent authority and the
company’s acquiescence will be equally important on those issues.
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS 134
Indian Oil Company, LLC v. Bishop Petroleum Inc. 135 held that in the absence of
an express or implied release, a non-operator assigning its interest under a 1989
M.F.O.A. remains liable for operating costs and plugging and abandonment
costs. Bishop Petroleum (Operator) was the operator under an A.A.P.L. Form
610—1989 Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) for a well in Escambia County,
Alabama. Operator drilled the Scott Paper 27-1 Well, which produced from
1993 until 2007. William E. Trotter, II (Non-Operator) was a non-operating
working interest owner under the JOA. In 2002, Non-Operator assigned his
8.5% working interest in the well to Indian Oil Company, LLC (Assignee),
notified Operator of the assignment, and thereafter, Operator distributed
revenues and billed expenses to Assignee. 136
When the well stopped producing in 2007, Operator eventually proposed a
workover under the “July AFE” in the amount of $589,800, which Assignee and
various other working interest owners approved, but it was not approved by
Non-Operator. Workover operations started on October 1, 2007, and were
more difficult and lengthy than Operator anticipated. As a result, Operator
abandoned the workover efforts in January 2008 after incurring approximately
$1.6 million in costs. In 2009, Operator sent an AFE to the working interest
owners in the amount of $243,300 for plugging and abandonment. 137
Neither Operator nor Assignee paid any expenses associated with the
reworking or plugging and abandonment. 138 Operator sued Non-Operator,
Assignee, and various other working interest owners for breach of contract,
quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. 139 Operator prevailed in the trial
court, and only Non-Operator appealed. 140
Non-Operator contended that Operator had breached the JOA as a matter of
law by (1) failing to provide daily workover reports 141 and (2) failing to issue a
new AFE when the workover became dramatically more complex and expensive
than the original AFE anticipated.142 Non-Operator also contended that its
134. Other notable cases dealing with industry contracts include the following:. El Paso Field
Services, L.P. v. MasTec North America, Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2012) (pipelines and
undiscovered foreign crossings); Lillis v. Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc., No. 03-10-00784-CV, 2013 WL
3186261 (Tex. App.—Austin June 18, 2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (gas gathering agreement);
Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno Ltd., LLP, 421 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. filed) (misappropriation of seismic maps as trade secret); Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P.,
No. 11-11-00290-CV, 2013 WL 5861496 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 31, 2013, no pet.)
(construction of participation agreement).
135. Indian Oil Company, LLC v. Bishop Petroleum Inc., 406 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed).
136. Id. at 647.
137. Id. at 648.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 648–49.
140. Id. at 649.
141. Id. at 653–54.
142. Id. at 654–55.
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liability for costs incurred should be limited to costs incurred in connection with
operations in which Non-Operator agreed to participate prior to Non-Operator’s
assignment to Assignee. 143
Non-Operator’s argument as to daily workover reports was based on Article
V.D.7(b) of the JOA, which stated, “Operator will send to Non-Operators such
reports, test results, and notices regarding the progress of operations on the well
as the Non-Operators shall reasonably request, including, but not limited to,
daily drilling reports, completion reports, and well logs.” 144 The court noted that
this language requires the operator to provide such reports as non-operators
“reasonably request,” and did not require the provision of “any and all
requested reports.” 145 Because Non-Operator never requested a report,
Operator’s failure to provide reports could not be considered breach of
contract. 146 Non-Operator also alleged that Operator was under a duty to
provide daily workover reports because such reports had been requested by one
of the other working interest owners. 147 The court noted that Non-Operator
offered no authority for the proposition that “one working interest owner’s
request for reports obligated [Operator] to send reports to every working interest
owner, including those who made no such request.” 148 The court held that NonOperator did not establish that by failing to provide workover reports, Operator
had breached the JOA as a matter of law. 149
Non-Operator also contended that Operator should have issued a new AFE
when the workover operations contemplated by the July AFE became
dramatically more expensive than originally anticipated and additional
operations were undertaken, and that Operator’s failure to do so was a breach of
the JOA. Non-Operator contended that the evidence established Operator’s
breach as a matter of law, but the court noted that the evidence was
contradictory. An expert witness had testified that issuing a new AFE would
have required dismissing the workover rig and that the fishing operations that
were conducted were a normal part of the kinds of workover operations
contemplated by the July AFE. Therefore, the court held that Non-Operator had
failed to show that Operator had breached the JOA. 150
The jury found that Non-Operator was liable for $336,393.42 for expenses
incurred under the JOA. Non-Operator argued that there was no evidence to
support this amount because (1) Non-Operator had assigned his interest to
Assignee in 2002, and Non-Operator was thus not liable for expenses
subsequently incurred under the JOA, and (2) Non-Operator had not consented
to the July AFE, and therefore, could not have incurred any expenses under
it. 151

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 655–66.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 654–55.
Id. at 656.
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The parties’ disagreement on this issue centered on different interpretations
of the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland
Energy, Inc. 152 The Supreme Court held that an assignor of a working interest
subject to a joint operating agreement remained liable for operating expenses
when the assignee failed to pay for the operating expenses attributable to that
interest (in Eland, plugging and abandonment costs). 153 Operator asserted that,
under Eland, in the absence of an express or implied release, Non-Operator
remained liable for all expenses incurred under the JOA, notwithstanding
Operator’s assignment to Assignee.154 This court distinguished Eland, because
the operating agreement construed in Eland did not address the assignor’s
liability for expenses incurred subsequent to the assignment. It was silent as to
continuing liabilities. 155 The JOA in this case was not silent as to a party’s
ongoing liability subsequent to an assignment. 156 The pertinent language from
the JOA provided:
[N]o assignment or other disposition of interest by a party shall relieve such
party of obligations previously incurred by such party hereunder with
respect to the interest transferred, including without limitation the
obligation of a party to pay all the costs attributable to an operation
conducted hereunder in which such party has agreed to participate prior to
making such assignments. 157
This language made Non-Operator liable for expenses “previously incurred,”
i.e., incurred before Non-Operator assigned to Assignee. 158 Non-Operator
conceded that Non-Operator continued to be liable for monthly operating costs
and the costs of plugging and abandoning the well. 159 However, Non-Operator
had assigned the working interest to Assignee in 2002, and Operator did not
request approval for the workover until 2007. 160 Under the “previously
incurred” language, Non-Operator could not be liable for expenses incurred
pursuant to the July AFE. 161
The amount the jury awarded included workover costs, monthly operating
expenses, and plugging and abandonment expenses. 162 Although the evidence
was insufficient to support the entire damage amount awarded against NonOperator, it was sufficient to support some damages.163 The court remanded the
case to determine liability and damages. 164
The significance of the case is that it limits the continuing obligations of non152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2006).
Indian Oil Co., 406 S.W.3d at 657 (citing Eland, 207 S.W.3d at 344).
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657–58 (citing Eland, 207 S.W.3d at 346–47).
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 660.
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operators under Eland, at least under the 1989 M.F.O.A., to those obligations
“previously incurred.” This does not mean accrued, but incurred, so the
assigning non-operator will continue to be liable for monthly operating costs,
plugging and abandonment costs, and other liabilities included in the operating
agreement. Presumably the assigning non-operator will be able to avoid only
those subsequent liabilities that require an express subsequent consent.
Although the issues on providing reports under an operating agreement
generally went off on evidence points, the opinion suggests that under the 1989
M.F.O.A., the obligation to deliver reports requires a reasonable request and not
every operational event of a workover will trigger an obligation to issue a new
AFE.
Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Berry-Helfand 165 held that the use for
personal gain of a prospect analysis disclosed under a confidentiality agreement
was a misappropriation of a trade secret. Over the course of several years,
Helfand (a reservoir engineer) and her geologist partners conducted a detailed
analysis of public and semi-public production data for 600 wells in a six county
area. 166 They identified ten sweet spots favorable for production from the James
Lime formation with several stacked pays. 167 Helfand focused on two of the
prospects where leases were available and began leasing with the object of selling
her prospects for cash and an overriding royalty interest. 168 In February 2005,
Southwestern Energy Production Company (Sepco) signed a confidentiality
agreement with Helfand regarding the materials to be presented by Helfand, and
Exhibit A, describing the area subject to the noncompetition agreement, was
limited to those two prospects. 169 Helfand then presented to Sepco the results of
her research and analysis identifying all ten of the sweet spots. 170 Prior to the
presentation, Sepco had no interest in the James Lime because of poor
production history. 171 After the presentation, Sepco declined to participate in
Helfand’s prospects, because the prospects failed Sepco’s economic criteria. 172
Helfand promptly sold the same two prospects to Petrohawk. 173 Soon after the
Helfand/Sepco meeting, Sepco began leasing land in the area of Helfand’s sweet
spots, ultimately acquiring 1,800 leases on or near the sweet spots. 174 Two years
after the presentation, Sepco drilled a successful James Lime well and then
began a large scale drilling program in the James Lime. 175 Ultimately, Sepco
drilled or participated in over eighty James Lime wells, all successful and all
clustered in and around Helfand’s sweet spots. 176 Helfand filed suit against

165. Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 411 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2013, pet. filed).
166. Id. at 597.
167. Id. 597–98.
168. Id. at 587.
169. Id. at 588.
170. Id. at 603.
171. Id. at 599.
172. Id. at 595.
173. Id. at 603.
174. Id. at 599.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 586–89, 600.
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Sepco in February 2009. 177 The jury found against Sepco on five liability
theories, including common law trade secret misappropriation. 178 The trial court
awarded approximately $11 million in actual damages to Helfand. 179
“A trade secret is ‘any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one’s business and presents an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.’” 180 The court quickly
concluded that Helfand’s “massive compilation and analysis” of data drawn
from public and semi-public sources was a trade secret, because it led her to
identify sweet spots and stacked pays. 181 Further, the court determined that
Helfand’s trade secret was not lost when she shared the material with other
operators because these disclosures were conditioned on the execution of
confidentiality agreements. 182
A plaintiff seeking to prevail on a trade secret misappropriation in Texas must
prove “(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) a breach of a confidential
relationship or improper discovery of the trade secret, (3) use of the trade secret,
and (4) damages.” 183 “Trade secret misappropriation may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” 184 “A person must bring suit for misappropriation of a
trade secret no later than three years after the misappropriation is discovered or
by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” 185
Sepco maintained that, even if Helfand’s analysis was a trade secret, there was
insufficient evidence to show that Sepco misappropriated the trade secret by
unauthorized use.186 Essentially, Sepco claimed that the circumstantial evidence
supporting Helfand’s misappropriation claim amounted to an unsupported
“before and after argument,” i.e., Sepco had no James Lime wells before meeting
with Helfand and three years later it had more than eighty wells. 187 Sepco also
offered other plausible explanations for its James Lime development, claiming
that the well locations chosen were the product of its own in-house study. 188
The court disagreed. Although Sepco had no interest in the James Lime prior
to the meeting, in the year that followed, it took approximately 1,800 leases that
included James Lime drilling rights, almost all of which were in Helfand’s sweet
spots. 189 Thereafter, Sepco drilled more than eighty successful James Lime wells,
all of which were in or near Helfand’s sweet spots. 190 The timing of Sepco’s
drilling of the James Lime wells coincided with the time required to implement

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 589, 602.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 597 (quoting In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003)).
Id. at 597–98.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.010(a) (West 2002)).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599–600.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 599–500.
Id. at 600.

118

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

a drilling program to exploit Helfrand’s secrets. 191 Further, Sepco failed to
produce sufficient independent research to explain its selection of drill sites. 192
According to the court, the circumstantial evidence supporting Helfand’s claim
was both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that Sepco
misappropriated and used Helfand’s trade secrets during the term of the
confidentiality agreement. 193
Sepco also argued that Helfand’s claim of misappropriation was barred by the
statute of limitations. 194 Sepco maintained that Helfand knew or should have
known of her wrongful injury before February 17, 2006, three years before she
sued Sepco. 195 In particular, Sepco cited emails Helfand sent in May 2005 that
expressed her frustration with Sepco’s failure to return all the materials provided
at the February 2005 presentation, as well as concern about the possible misuse
of her trade secret. 196 Sepco returned her materials shortly thereafter with
assurances it retained nothing. Helfand was entitled to rely on these assurances
and “had no objective reasonable basis for further inquiry into Sepco’s
conduct.” 197 Even if she had made further inquiries before October 2007, when
Sepco drilled its first James Lime well, her investigation would have revealed
nothing, because the pattern of James Lime wells would not be apparent for
many months thereafter. 198 Helfand testified that she first learned of Sepco’s
misappropriation in January 2009. 199 Accordingly, the court held that there was
no evidence that Helfand knew or should have known that Sepco had
misappropriated her trade secret before February 16, 2006. 200
Several other interesting issues were raised in the case. The court held that
confidentiality agreements do not necessarily create fiduciary relationships, and
this confidentiality agreement did not create a fiduciary relationship. 201 There
can be no theft of a trade secret when the secret is voluntarily delivered. 202 There
is an extensive analysis of the appropriate measure of damages, methodology of
calculating damages, and proof of damages. 203
This case is significant because of the holding that a prospect analysis can be a
trade secret and that misappropriation may result in substantial liability.
Confidentiality agreements are commonly used in the industry; the specific
terms and conditions of this confidentiality agreement are commonly included,
and the attendant risks and protections are highlighted by this case. Sepco
protected itself against the noncompetition provision by limiting the scope of
the lands described in Exhibit A, but lost this case because it (1) used the trade
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 602–03.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 603–04.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 599–601.
See id. at 608–14.
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secret, and (2) the use was during the term of the agreement.
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. 204 held that course
of performance by the parties was part of a contract for the purchase and sale of
oil under the U.C.C. and should be considered regardless of whether the
contract was ambiguous. Anadarko sold oil to Williams under two purchase
agreements in 2000 and 2002. 205 Both of these agreements contained a
provision that tied the contract price for crude oil to other factors, including a
third-party accounting arrangement for quality adjustments by the TAPS Quality
Bank for oil shipped through the pipeline. 206 The contract price between
Anadarko and Williams would be adjusted on a monthly basis according to the
anticipated adjustment by Quality Bank, but the actual adjustment would not be
known until Williams actually received debits or credits from Quality Bank the
following month.207 The parties would then “true-up” the price, or bring it to
the correct balance, in the following month’s invoice based on the actual Quality
Bank credits or debits as received by Williams.208 Several years after the contracts
terminated, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) revised the
methodology used to assess the quality of oil entering a pipeline and
retroactively applied the change, effective as of February 1, 2000. 209 The change
in methodology resulted in over a $9 million credit paid to Williams attributable
to Anadarko’s oil. 210 In August 2007, Williams received the credit and refused
to pay Anadarko. 211
The court held that under the U.C.C., “a contract for the sale of oil is a
contract for the sale of goods.” 212 Williams contended that, under the U.C.C.,
the court could not consider evidence of course of performance without first
finding that the contracts were ambiguous. 213 The court disagreed and held that
“‘[u]nless carefully negated,’” the course of performance becomes “‘an element
of the meaning of the words used,’” and that “‘the course of actual performance
by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing
to mean.’” 214
The contract payment provision required that the payments from Williams to
Anadarko must be timely, but there was no time limitation on Williams’s
obligation to correct any errors in an adjustment found later. 215 In fact, under
the parties’ course of performance, adjustments were constantly made to the
amount of payment due after the contract payment date had passed to “true up”

204.
2013).
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 737 F.3 966 (5th Cir.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 968–69.
Id. at 969.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 969 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.107(a) (West 2009)).
Id. at 970 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202, cmt. 1 (West 2009)).
Id. (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202, cmt. 2 (West 2009)).
Id. at 970–71.
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the amount due after the receipt of the adjustments from Quality Bank. 216 The
court held that, although the FERC’s methodology changes did not occur
during the contract period, the parties had a history of not treating the payment
provision’s monthly schedule as conclusive on the obligation to pay a final,
correct purchase price. 217
The court also held that Williams’ obligation to pay the correct contract price
survived the termination of the contracts. 218 Upon termination of a contract, all
executory obligations are discharged, but “‘any right based on prior breach or
performance survives.’” 219 An obligation is executory if both parties have an
obligation yet to be performed. 220 The court held that Williams’ obligation to
“remit Quality Bank credits . . . is tied to Anadarko’s prior tender of the crude
oil.” 221 Therefore, the court concluded that “where Anadarko has already
discharged its full performance under the contract by tendering the oil, Williams
Alaska’s obligation to pay the correct contract price, including the Quality Bank
credits, is no longer executory and thus survives the contract’s termination.” 222
Williams also contended that Anadarko’s claim was barred by the four-year
statute of limitations. The court disagreed and held that the contracts were
breached at the time Williams received the adjustments and failed to remit them
to Anadarko, which was in August 2007. Anadarko filed suit in March 2011,
which was within the limitations period. 223
The significance of this case is that in contracts governed by the U.C.C. (here,
the sale of oil), course of performance is made part of the contract, is admissible
without a prior finding of ambiguity, and is considered the best indication of
what the parties intended by their agreement. This can only be avoided if
carefully negated in the written agreement. Only executory obligations are
discharged by contract termination.
V. LITIGATION ISSUES 224
Richmond v. Wells 225 held that the rights to ownership of the non-possessory

216. Id. at 971.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.106(c) (West 2009)).
220. Id. (quoting Lee v. Cherry, 812 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991,
writ denied)).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Other notable cases dealing with litigation issues include the following: Cabot Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Healey, L.P., No. 12-11-00236-CV, 2013 WL 1282007 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 28, 2013,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (termination of lease for breach of covenant, failure to object to trial as a
declaratory judgment action rather than in trespass to the title, evidence, and submission issues in
unleased cotenant cases); Kadane Corp. v. Cholla Petroleum, Inc., No. 11-11-00236-CV, 2013 WL
3336612 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (disconnection of wells to
pipeline as trespass); Lucas v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00592-JRG, 2013 WL
5200046 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013) (class action on deduction of post-production costs);
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. ENI U.S. Operating Co., Inc., No. CIV.A. H-121366, 2013 WL 5913245 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (admiralty law governs offshore lease of vessel).
225. Richmond v. Wells, 395 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, pet. denied).
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interests of a lessor under an oil and gas lease (royalty and the possibility of
reverter) should be determined in a declaratory judgment action rather than in
trespass to try title. Simplified, Richmond owned the minerals in a tract that
Richmond leased to Endeavor under a typical oil and gas lease. Endeavor
completed and placed the Richmond No. 43 into production on the leased
tract. 226 Richmond contracted with Zugg to sell the tract to Zugg, but Richmond
would keep his mineral rights. 227 The Richmond-to-Zugg warranty deed was
made subject to oil and gas leases of record and excepted “all oil, gas and other
minerals in, on or under said land reserved by prior grantors.” 228 Zugg sold to
Wells, and the Zugg-to-Wells warranty deed contained the same language. 229
Endeavor suspended royalty payments to Richmond when Wells notified
Endeavor that royalty payments should be made to Wells. 230 Richmond and
Wells filed competing motions for summary judgment. 231
Wells’ motion was for declaratory relief under Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies code. 232 The trial court granted the motion, holding that
both deeds conveyed the mineral estate, that Richmond reserved no interest in
the mineral estate, that Richmond was not entitled to any proceeds from the
mineral estate, and that Richmond was not entitled to a reformation of the
Richmond-to-Zugg deed. 233
Richmond contended that Wells should have brought his claim in trespass to
try title under Chapter 22 of the Texas Property Code and that Wells failed to
meet his burden under that cause of action. 234 Richmond relied on Martin v.
Amerman 235 in which the Texas Supreme Court held generally that trespass to try
title is the method for determining title to real property. 236 The court
distinguished Martin because the facts in that case involved a possessory
interest. 237 Under the lease to Endeavor, the lessor retained only a royalty
interest and a possibility of reverter, which are non-possessory interests. 238
Claims to a royalty interest and the possibility of reverter are not properly the
subject of a trespass-to-try title cause of action. 239 Even though the construction
of the two deeds could ultimately impact title and possessory rights to the
interests involved, the court held that the legislature did not intend for the
trespass-to-try title statute to displace the declaratory judgment statute in this

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 266.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 265.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 266.
235. 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004).
236. Id. at 262, 267; Richmond, 395 S.W.3d at 267.
237. Richmond, 395 S.W.3d at 267.
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing T-Vestco Litt-Vada v. Lu-cal One Oil Co., 651 S.W.2d 284, 289–90 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. State, 86 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Austin 1935, no writ)).
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case. 240 The declaratory judgment statute expressly provides that any person
interested under a deed may have determined any question of construction
arising under the deed and obtain a declaration of rights. 241
Richmond’s motion for summary judgment for reformation of the
Richmond-to-Zugg deed presumably would have been granted as to Zugg, but
the issue in the case was whether Wells was a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice of Richmond’s claim. Reformation is a claim for equitable relief
that will not be granted if there is a bona fide purchaser. The issue was notice. 242
Richmond argued that Wells had constructive notice based on the pump jack
and batteries on the tract. The court held that this would be notice of
Endeavor’s rights of possession and Endeavor’s fee simple determinable
ownership interest. “At the time of the Zugg-to-Wells deed, the interests claimed
by [Richmond] were non-possessory ones, and Endeavor’s possession did not put
[Wells] on notice of any interest claimed by [Richmond].” 243 However, there was
some evidence that Wells had actual knowledge of Richmond’s interest, there
were genuine issues of material fact on whether Wells had actual knowledge,
and the burden of proof was on Richmond. 244 The court reversed the trial
court’s judgment granting Wells’s motion for summary judgment and remanded
for trial. 245
The opinion appears to hold that the non-possessory interests of a lessor
under an oil and gas lease cannot be determined in trespass to try title and must
be resolved in a declaratory judgment action. This is probably too broad, but the
petition was denied in this case. It is also interesting that the oil and gas
operations on the property were apparently held to be insufficient to give
constructive notice of the rights of any party, except as to the interests of the
lessee conducting the operations.
VI. REGULATION ISSUES 246
In re Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. 247 held that the trial court must make a
preliminary finding as to a developer’s status as a common carrier before issuing
a writ of possession pending final resolution of the landowner’s challenge to the
developer’s common carrier status. Unsuccessful at negotiating the purchase of
an easement necessary for its crude petroleum pipeline, TransCanada Keystone
Pipeline, L.P. (TransCanada) filed a petition for condemnation of land owned
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (West 2008)).
242. Id. at 268.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 268–69.
245. Id. at 269.
246. Other notable cases dealing with regulation issues include the following: Crosstex NGL
Pipeline, L.P. v. Reins Rd. Farms-1, Ltd., 404 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.)
(pipeline as common carrier); Crawford Family Farm P’ship v. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline,
L.P., 409 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. filed) (pipeline as common carrier); Walton
v. City of Midland, 409 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet. denied) (city drilling permit
and governmental immunity).
247. In re Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd., 402 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013,
mandamus denied).
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by Texas Rice Land Partners, L.P., James Holland, and David Holland
(collectively, TRL). The trial court appointed special commissioners to hear the
matter, who then granted TransCanada the easement and awarded TRL
$20,808 in compensation for the easement. TRL objected to the commissioners’
decision and requested a jury trial on TransCanada’s common carrier status
under the Texas Natural Resource Code. 248
TransCanada filed a motion for a writ of possession pending resolution of the
jury trial and deposited the full award of $20,808 in the court registry, along
with a surety bond and cost bond. 249 The court issued the writ of possession to
TransCanada, and TRL filed a petition for writ of mandamus, claiming the trial
court abused its discretion in granting TransCanada’s writ of possession prior to
resolving its challenge to TransCanada’s common carrier status. 250
Relying on Texas Rice Land Partners, Limited v. Denbury Green Pipeline—Texas,
LLC, 251 TRL argued that the trial court was required to fully resolve
TransCanada’s common carrier status before TransCanada could take
possession of TRL’s private property in conjunction with its suit for
condemnation. 252 In Denbury Green, the Texas Supreme Court explained that
once a landowner challenges an entity’s prima facie evidence of common carrier
status pursuant to a permit granted by the Texas Railroad Commission, “the
burden falls upon the pipeline company to establish its common-carrier bona
fides if it wishes to exercise the power of eminent domain. . . . Merely holding
oneself out [as a common carrier] is insufficient under Texas law to thwart
judicial review.” 253
However, the court noted that the Supreme Court, in Denbury Green,
expressly limited its opinion to determining common carrier status under
Section 111.002(6) of the Texas Resource Code. 254 The Supreme Court did not
address Section 21.021 of the Texas Property Code, the statute at issue in this
case.
Section 21.021 allows a party with eminent domain authority to take
possession of the condemned property, “pending the results of further
litigation” if that party pays the property owner the amount of damages
and costs awarded by the special commissioners or deposits the amount of
the award into the registry of the court. 255
“Nevertheless, we recognize that there must be evidence in the record that
reasonably supports TransCanada’s assertion that it is an entity with ‘eminent
domain authority,’ and it was error for the trial court to refrain from making
such a preliminary finding.” 256 However, the court held that the trial court’s
248. Id. at 336.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 336–38.
251. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Limited v. Denbury Green Pipeline—Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d
192 (Tex. 2012).
252. In re Tex. Rice, 402 S.W.3d at 338.
253. Denbury Green, 363 S.W.3d at 202.
254. In re Tex. Rice, 402 S.W.3d at 339.
255. Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.021).
256. Id. at 339–40.
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failure to make such a finding was harmless, given uncontroverted evidence in
an affidavit submitted by TransCanada that its pipeline would be operated as a
common carrier pipeline and that “‘[a]ny shipper wishing to transport crude
petroleum meeting the specifications set forth in the [applicable] tariff . . . will
have access to ship its crude petroleum on the pipeline for a fee[.]” 257
The significance of this case is the court’s holding that the trial court erred by
failing to make a preliminary finding of TransCanada’s common carrier status
before issuing a writ of possession.
VII. CONCLUSION
The title and conveyancing cases this year brought further definition to the
precedents involving recurring issues, such as the conveyance of fractional
royalties, property rights conveyed or reserved by implication when the
instrument is silent, and common rules of construction. These should be helpful
to title examiners and to draftsmen who never want to hear from title
examiners. However, the most interesting case and the one with the potential to
have the most significance is Key Operating 258 dealing with the implied surface
easement held by the owner of the mineral estate. This easement affects basic
property rights and is very important to development operations. The petition
has been granted in this case, and the Texas Supreme Court has recently written
extensively on the accommodation doctrine. There is a close relationship
between that doctrine and the scope of the implied surface easement. Texas
public policy has long favored mineral development, but increasing urbanization
has brought increasing pressure on that public policy.
The sharp increase in leasing, the dramatic increase in the value of mineral
rights, and the volatility in that value have produced many cases involving lease
and leasing issues. Most are focused on the usual issues of royalty calculations,
post-production costs, and lease perpetuation. However, a few cases really stand
out. There is now clear precedent for the unacceptable level of risk that is
inherent in accepting a lease provision that terminates a lease for breach of
covenant. No lessee should accept such a provision. The wide spread use of
contract landmen and the rush to acquire acreage has resulted in more than a
little confusion in lease terms, authority to lease, and conditions to leasing. A
landman clothed with apparent authority coupled with delay in promptly
repudiating unacceptable terms or leases may result in a lease that the company
never signed and never wanted, but nevertheless a lease that must be purchased.
The overriding royalty owner has never had much protection under the law, and
it now appears that in the absence of a contractual duty or a relationship duty
on the lessee, the lessee is free to pursue a lessee’s own interests in washing out
the overriding royalty interest in any lease renegotiation.
The risk of assigning to a weak assignee is inescapable under many operating
agreements. It is not an industry practice to obtain releases from the other
257. Id. at 340 (quoting affidavit of Louis Fenyvesi, director of markets and supply for
TransCanada).
258. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 403 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
201, pet. granted.).
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working interest parties when an assignment is made, and not at all clear how
such a release could actually be obtained. This is a material and unresolved
problem under the model form operating agreements. Geologists and the
purveyors of prospects in general should rejoice at the increase in protection
found in recent cases for their work product. The work is valuable, and if
confidentiality is maintained, it will be protected. The confidentiality
agreements, nondisclosure agreements, and noncompetition agreements that the
industry routinely employs, all have teeth. The trend will be to resist those
agreements and to restrict their scope when it becomes a necessary risk to get a
peek at the data. Although it is well established that the U.C.C. governs
contracts for the purchase and sale of severed minerals, few appreciate that the
course of performance can be more important in defining the rights of the
parties than the written agreement.
A very significant trend in recent years has been to renew the primacy of the
proceeding in trespass to try title as the proper action to resolve title issues.
Because litigators have for decades defaulted to the declaratory judgment action
to resolve matters in controversy, lawyers and judges are still trying cases without
following the procedure mandated for trespass to try title. The opinions on
appeal stretch to save the ones they can, but the litigators should by now have
the message.
There seems to be some kind of organized guerilla warfare going on against
pipelines. The pipelines have for years generally just rolled out their projects, but
now there is widespread opposition and procedural and substantive challenges
at every turn. The most common thread is an attack on common carrier status.
While it seems unlikely that the ultimate power of the pipelines will be
materially reduced, the exercise of that power is being strictly examined and
construed.
There was not much from the Texas Supreme Court this year, but it seems
like none of the parties are now willing to stop before filing a petition for review.
The Supreme Court will hear only a few cases, but next year could be
interesting.

